Turkey Archives - Red Notice Abuse Report

Notices and Diffusions Task Force: The Most Secretive Part of INTERPOL’s Redress Mechanism

By Yuriy Nemets | June 1, 2022 | Comments 0 Comment

In August 2017, just over two weeks apart, two European Union citizens, writer Dogan Akhanli and journalist Hamza Yalçin, both critical of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s regime, were detained in Spain. Spanish authorities acted on requests that Turkey was able to disseminate via INTERPOL following what Erdogan branded a failed coup against him. After these incidents, a meeting between European Union and INTERPOL officials took place during which the latter reportedly assured their counterparts that the INTERPOL Notices and Diffusions Task Force (NDTF) was reviewing 40,000 Red Notices to ensure that they were not politically motivated. At the time, I wrote about my doubts regarding the NDTF activities. Among the things I questioned was how INTERPOL was planning on conducting such a massive review in an effective and objective manner. A comprehensive examination of 40,000 government requests would be an enormous undertaking, even if INTERPOL significantly increased its staff and funding. Such a review would require INTERPOL to go far beyond what is already recorded in its databases, which is the very limited information that governments must produce to have their requests disseminated via the organization’s channels. In most cases, such information does not allow INTERPOL to ensure that a government request complies with its rules. However, it was not only the high volume of information that the NDTF would have to go through that made me question its activities, but the source of such information as well. Because INTERPOL is prohibited from sharing with an individual any information about her or him without the government’s consent, or even the existence of such information in the organization’s databases, the NDTF would often have to look to the government alone for any information about a particular case. It is hard to imagine a country seeking to abuse INTERPOL and at the same time willing to produce objective information to help the organization to conduct a comprehensive assessment of the country’s use of its channels.

Four and a half years later, my doubts concerning the NDTF have anything but disappeared. I continue to consider it part of INTERPOL’s public relations strategy in the face of the growing discontent over the organization’s involvement in human rights violations as opposed to a meaningful step towards the protection of victims of abuse of INTERPOL’s channels. There is virtually no information about the NDTF in the public domain. The only thing that INTERPOL has allowed the public to learn is that the NDTF consists of several dozen staff tasked with assessing government requests at its own initiative. There is no publicly available information on the requirements that the NDTF staff must meet or the methodologies or procedures that it must follow, if any. Moreover, INTERPOL has not disclosed the results of the NDTF work, which begs the question: is the NDTF effective at all? How many government requests has the NDTF reviewed since it was established, how many of them has it found to be in violation of INTERPOL’s rules, what is the nature of such violations, who are the countries-abusers? All these questions remain unanswered. Moreover, I am not aware of any case in which the NDTF has informed the individual concerned about the results of its review.

Why not bring NDTF, which INTERPOL promotes as an important addition to its redress mechanism, out of the shadows? Why not adopt and publish requirements and procedures that the NDTF must follow as well as the information about the results of its work? Unlike the NDTF, the Commission for the Control of INTERPOL’s Files (CCF), another part of the INTERPOL redress mechanism, has a statute, rules of procedure, and it publishes excerpts from its decisions in individual cases, thereby providing practitioners with some insight into its application of INTERPOL’s rules. Although CCF is still far from achieving its much-needed transparency, the NDTF does not have even one percent of the information published about it that is publicly available about CCF. Under such circumstances, the NDTF cannot be seen as even remotely meaningful in the fight against INTERPOL abuse.

The INTERPOL General Assembly Has Just Set Its Priorities, and Human Rights is Not One of Them

By Yuriy Nemets | November 29, 2021 | Comments 0 Comment

I don’t recall another year in which INTERPOL received as much criticism from the media and advocacy organizations for its handling of government abuse of its channels – and did so much more to validate that criticism.

This year, the INTERPOL 89^th General Assembly met in Turkey. When the host was announced, many of us expressed our frustration. Turkey is well known for abusing INTERPOL. The most glaring example was reportedly its attempt to put numerous people accused of participating in the failed coup against president Erdogan on the INTERPOL wanted list. As member countries’ delegates were preparing for their trip to Istanbul this year, the Turkish government complained about INTERPOL refusing to cooperate in some of those cases against the Gülen movement. INTERPOL’s rules do not grant countries-hosts of its meetings any privileges when it comes to filling high posts within the organization or voting to amend its rules. However, for a country accused of abusing INTERPOL, the expenses are still worth it – if INTERPOL accepts the invitation, the host country looks accepted as well despite its misconduct.

We then learned that INTERPOL had lifted the “corrective measures” that it imposed on Syria nine years earlier. That announcement from INTERPOL made even bigger news, with numerous voices expressing concern for Syrian refugees whose risk of being detained and extradited had become even more real.

The New Mosque (Yeni Cami) in Istanbul, Turkey

Yet another cause for concern was the UAE and China, both known for abusing INTERPOL, and who both fought to have their nationals elected to the Executive Committee. The INTERPOL president heads the Executive Committee which, among other things, supervises the execution of the General Assembly’s decisions and the General Secretariat’s work. The 89^th General Assembly approved the changes to INTERPOL’s rules that are supposed to make the elections of president and other members of the Executive Committee more transparent and the Code of Conduct for Executive Committee members, all of this only to elect the UAE representative INTERPOL’s new president the next day. This happened despite the serious allegations and harrowing recollections published against the country’s regime. China now has its national on the Executive Committee as well. To complete the sad irony, this Executive Committee will vote to adopt the Code of Conduct for its members presented to it by the General Assembly.

What about the redress mechanism for the victims of INTERPOL abuse? While the General Assembly approved the organization’s budget for 2022, the already strained budget of the Commission for the Control of INTERPOL’s Files responsible for adjudicating complaints from individuals challenging government use of INTERPOL’s resources was left virtually unchanged. This is despite the growing number of cases before the Commission. Finally, the 89^th INTERPOL General Assembly did not consider the much-needed reforms necessary to guarantee victims of INTERPOL abuse due process.

Clearly, the majority of INTERPOL member countries do not take the abuse of the organization’s channels seriously. If they did, the results of the 89^th General Assembly would be very different – it would have selected a different president, passed the reforms to close the loopholes in the INTERPOL redress mechanism and significantly increased the budget of the Commission for the Control of INTERPOL’s Files.

American Bar Association Panel ‘Red Notices and the INTERPOL Wanted List: Balancing Law Enforcement with Due Process’

By Yuriy Nemets | February 7, 2019 | Comments 0 Comment

On January 29, 2019, Theodore Bromund (The Heritage Foundation), Michelle Estlund (Estlund Law), Yuriy Nemets (Nemets Law Firm), Rebecca Schaeffer (Fair Trials) and Bruce Zagaris (Berliner Corcoran & Rowe) spoke at the event ‘Red Notices and the INTERPOL Wanted List: Balancing Law Enforcement with Due Process’ organized by the American Bar Association (ABA) and Association of Certified Financial Crime Specialists (ACFCS). The panel discussed the problem of INTERPOL abuse by governments that use the organization’s resources to persecute political opponents and other victims of unlawful criminal prosecutions:

On INTERPOL’s former General Counsel’s statement regarding EU calls to reform INTERPOL

By Yuriy Nemets | December 28, 2017 | Comments 0 Comment

On October 5, 2017, EUObserver reported that the European Union was seeking a dialogue with INTERPOL to find a way to stop the abuse of its resources by countries that use INTERPOL to persecute political opponents and other victims of unlawful criminal prosecutions. The call for negotiations followed the recent detention of Dogan Akhanli, a German-Turkish writer, and Hamza Yalcin, a Swedish-Turkish journalist. Spanish authorities detained them at Turkey’s request disseminated via INTERPOL’s channels. Akhanli and Yalcin fled Turkey many years ago and were granted refugee status in Europe.

In seeking the dialogue, the European Union leaders expressed their desire for a proper review of INTERPOL red notices. They have also indicated that the need exists for an effective redress mechanism for the victims of INTERPOL abuse.

On October 16, 2017, EUObserver published an op-ed titled ‘INTERPOL and the EU: don’t play politics.’ Its authors, Rutsel Sylvestre J. Martha, an INTERPOL’s former General Counsel, and Stephen Bailey, argue that the INTERPOL General Secretariat already conducts a proper review of red notices before their publication and an effective redress mechanism is already in place.

Indeed, INTERPOL must ensure that red notices comply with its rules. Every year INTERPOL processes numerous requests to locate and detain individuals. It would seem possible for the organization to review every red notice for its compliance with such minimum requirements as the nature of the charge behind the notice and make sure the identity particulars, the description of the facts of the case, and a reference to the country’s criminal statute and a valid arrest warrant accompany the red notice. However, taking into consideration the high volume of information INTERPOL processes on a regular basis, it cannot possibly look into all the circumstances behind each and every red notice to make sure none is politically motivated or doesn’t otherwise violate the organization’s rules prior to its publication. This is also true with regard to the compliance review of randomly selected already published red notices. In addition, the authors of the op-ed don’t mention the so-called “diffusions,” which, like red notices, may be used as requests to locate and detain individuals for the purpose of their extradition and may be disseminated among a large number of INTERPOL member countries. However, unlike red notices, governments can send diffusions via INTERPOL’s channels without any prior review by the General Secretariat. Because of the lack of oversight prior to their publication, diffusions represent a more attractive means for governments that abuse INTERPOL’s resources, and as such, they pose an even higher risk than red notices.

In claiming there is an effective redress mechanism for the victims of INTERPOL abuse, the authors of the op-ed mention the right of an individual to access, correct, and/or delete information in INTERPOL’s files. It is important to remember that the right to access the information in the organization’s databases is subject to the government’s consent to disclose such information to the individual. This is also the case with any evidence and other information the government submits to the Commission for the Control of INTERPOL’s Files, an independent body with the exclusive power to adjudicate requests from individuals seeking access to, correction, and/or deletion of information in INTERPOL’s databases. The Commission discloses the evidence or other information the government submits in response to the individual’s request if the government agrees to such disclosure.

The authors of the op-ed rightfully point to the reforms INTERPOL has recently carried out to expand the rights of individuals. However, despite the reforms, the existing redress mechanism still lacks some crucial safeguards inherent to the modern democratic due process, such as the right to a hearing and the right to appeal. In June 2014, the INTERPOL Executive Committee endorsed a new policy on refugees. According to the policy, “in general, the processing of red notices and diffusions against refugees will not be allowed if the following conditions are met: the status of refugee or asylum-seeker has been confirmed, the notice/diffusion has been requested by the country where the individual fears persecution, the granting of refugee status is not based on political grounds vis-a-vis the requesting country.” Although the policy is a significant step towards protection of refugees from INTERPOL abuse, it needs improvements. For example, the policy doesn’t grant refugees an exception to the rule that INTERPOL doesn’t disclose whether there is information about the individual in its databases without the government’s consent. As a result, refugees, like other individuals, often learn about a red notice or diffusion against them after they are detained due to the INTERPOL alert. In such cases, the rights provided in the policy come too late. This is one of the reasons why the detention of refugees like Dogan Akhanli and Hamza Yalcin continues despite the fact that the policy has been in place for several years.

Turkey and Ukraine Trying to Involve INTERPOL in Mass Prosecutions?

By Yuriy Nemets | December 24, 2017 | Comments 0 Comment

In July 2017, Hürriyet Daily News reported that Turkey tried to put 60,000 individuals allegedly linked to the recent attempt to overthrow President Recep Tayyip Erdogan on the INTERPOL wanted list. Only INTERPOL and Turkey know how many of those 60,000 people had a red notice or diffusion recorded against them. It is unclear whether INTERPOL’s efforts to rebuff the attempt to abuse its channels have been effective.

Turkey is not the only country that has sought to use INTERPOL to persecute members of the same political, business, or other group en masse, although its attempt is one of the most egregious. Whether through a regular election or coup, an incoming government may decide to open a criminal investigation into the former cabinet members and use INTERPOL to locate them and seek their extradition. Ukraine is yet another recent example of a new government seeking INTERPOL’s cooperation in apprehending its predecessors.

*Independence Square (Maidan Nezalezhnosti) in Kiev, Ukraine*

It has been reported that INTERPOL denied most of Ukraine’s repeated requests to put Viktor Yanukovich, the ex-president of Ukraine, and many of his former cabinet members on the international wanted list. Ukraine has criticized INTERPOL’s unwillingness to cooperate and accused the organization of political bias. It is evident, however, that with regard to the requests from Turkey and Ukraine INTERPOL has been doing exactly the opposite: it has been trying to maintain its neutrality and avoid any involvement in politics, as Article 3 of its Constitution requires.

Red Notice Abuse: INTERPOL’s Disclosures Fail to Identify Countries-Offenders and Their Violations

By Yuriy Nemets | December 16, 2017 | Comments 0 Comment

In its annual reports, the Commission for the Control of INTERPOL’s Files usually discloses the list of countries with regard to which it has received the most requests from individuals. It is important to remember that INTERPOL defines a request from an individual as a complaint, preliminary request, or request for access. The Commission prefers not to disclose the number of complaints it has received against each of the member countries, their nature, or its findings.

In its 2015 annual report, the Commission named the following member countries and the number of individual requests it had received concerning each of them:

Russia – 45
Ukraine – 24
USA – 23
UAE – 19
Egypt – 13
Italy – 13
India – 12
Venezuela – 10
Turkey – 9

The 2010 report is the only publication in which the Commission has publicly identified the countries against which it has received the majority of complaints. Since then, the Commission has only published the number of requests concerning individual countries without clarifying how many of those are complaints.

According to the 2010 report, Russia has been second only to India in terms of the number of requests and complaints. Between 2012 and 2015 (the 2011 annual report doesn’t contain the number of requests filed against individual countries), INTERPOL received more requests concerning Russia than any other country. At the same time, India moved to fourth place in 2013 and 2014 and seventh in 2015. In addition to Russia, the Commission has publicly identified other former Soviet Union republics with regard to which it has received individual requests, namely Belarus, Moldova, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. In 2013, Ukraine was number seven. In 2015, it moved up to second place. Belarus was sixth in 2010, eighth in 2012, and ninth in 2013. The country isn’t mentioned in the 2014 or 2015 annual reports.

Among the countries that have remained on the Commission’s list since 2010 are the United Arab Emirates, Venezuela, and the United States. The United Arab Emirates has moved from fifth place in 2010 to second in 2012, eighth in 2013, second in 2014, and fourth in 2015. The United States and Venezuela have consistently appeared on that list too, with the United States remaining in third place since 2010.

Because these numbers reflect individual requests without specifying how many of those are complaints, their basis, or the Commission’s findings, they can’t be used to calculate how many times each member country has engaged in INTERPOL red notice abuse or understand the nature of that country’s violations. This lack of transparency has continued despite the dramatic increase in the number of individual requests and complaints in particular. The Commission should be more transparent and publish this information. It is necessary for the general public to stay informed so that it can hold INTERPOL and its member countries accountable.

Tag: Turkey