Political Prosecutions & INTERPOL Archives - Page 3 of 3

Due to lack of deterrence, Russia’s INTERPOL membership is unlikely to be threatened despite numerous violations

By Yuriy Nemets | February 16, 2018 | Comments 0 Comment

Bill Browder has called upon INTERPOL to suspend Russia’s membership after the country renewed its efforts to put him on the international wanted list. Despite five unsuccessful attempts, Russia’s law enforcement agencies hope to secure INTERPOL’s cooperation in Mr. Browder’s case. So far, the organization has been unwilling to cooperate and in a rare public statement about an individual case called it predominantly political. However, despite Russia’s repeated violations of INTERPOL’s rules in this and other cases, the country’s membership is unlikely in any danger.

Under its regulations, INTERPOL is authorized to suspend or withdraw any user’s access to the organization’s databases, including any of its member countries, if that user violates INTERPOL’s rules on data processing. It is unclear whether INTERPOL has ever used that power. Certain recent examples suggest that the organization would rather avoid punishing a country. For example, it has been reported that Turkey tried to put 60,000 individuals allegedly linked to the 2016 failed coup against President Recep Tayyip Erdogan on the INTERPOL wanted list. According to these reports, INTERPOL refused to sanction Turkey for what appears to be an unprecedented violation of the organization’s Constitution, which strictly forbids INTERPOL to undertake any intervention or activities of a political character. If INTERPOL is reluctant to punish governments for such egregious violations, is there a limit, which, if crossed, would eventually force the organization to sanction the government?

*The Prosecutor General’s Office of the Russian Federation, Moscow*

INTERPOL’s unwillingness to suspend or withdraw access to its resources is not without reason. A country without access to INTERPOL’s databases might not be able to identify criminals wanted by other countries or inform foreign law enforcement about criminals possibly entering their territories, which could be detrimental to regional and global security. However, without a punishment effective enough to deter governments from abusing INTERPOL’s resources, the organization will always remain a tool in the hands of oppressive regimes.

On INTERPOL’s former General Counsel’s statement regarding EU calls to reform INTERPOL

By Yuriy Nemets | December 28, 2017 | Comments 0 Comment

On October 5, 2017, EUObserver reported that the European Union was seeking a dialogue with INTERPOL to find a way to stop the abuse of its resources by countries that use INTERPOL to persecute political opponents and other victims of unlawful criminal prosecutions. The call for negotiations followed the recent detention of Dogan Akhanli, a German-Turkish writer, and Hamza Yalcin, a Swedish-Turkish journalist. Spanish authorities detained them at Turkey’s request disseminated via INTERPOL’s channels. Akhanli and Yalcin fled Turkey many years ago and were granted refugee status in Europe.

In seeking the dialogue, the European Union leaders expressed their desire for a proper review of INTERPOL red notices. They have also indicated that the need exists for an effective redress mechanism for the victims of INTERPOL abuse.

On October 16, 2017, EUObserver published an op-ed titled ‘INTERPOL and the EU: don’t play politics.’ Its authors, Rutsel Sylvestre J. Martha, an INTERPOL’s former General Counsel, and Stephen Bailey, argue that the INTERPOL General Secretariat already conducts a proper review of red notices before their publication and an effective redress mechanism is already in place.

Indeed, INTERPOL must ensure that red notices comply with its rules. Every year INTERPOL processes numerous requests to locate and detain individuals. It would seem possible for the organization to review every red notice for its compliance with such minimum requirements as the nature of the charge behind the notice and make sure the identity particulars, the description of the facts of the case, and a reference to the country’s criminal statute and a valid arrest warrant accompany the red notice. However, taking into consideration the high volume of information INTERPOL processes on a regular basis, it cannot possibly look into all the circumstances behind each and every red notice to make sure none is politically motivated or doesn’t otherwise violate the organization’s rules prior to its publication. This is also true with regard to the compliance review of randomly selected already published red notices. In addition, the authors of the op-ed don’t mention the so-called “diffusions,” which, like red notices, may be used as requests to locate and detain individuals for the purpose of their extradition and may be disseminated among a large number of INTERPOL member countries. However, unlike red notices, governments can send diffusions via INTERPOL’s channels without any prior review by the General Secretariat. Because of the lack of oversight prior to their publication, diffusions represent a more attractive means for governments that abuse INTERPOL’s resources, and as such, they pose an even higher risk than red notices.

In claiming there is an effective redress mechanism for the victims of INTERPOL abuse, the authors of the op-ed mention the right of an individual to access, correct, and/or delete information in INTERPOL’s files. It is important to remember that the right to access the information in the organization’s databases is subject to the government’s consent to disclose such information to the individual. This is also the case with any evidence and other information the government submits to the Commission for the Control of INTERPOL’s Files, an independent body with the exclusive power to adjudicate requests from individuals seeking access to, correction, and/or deletion of information in INTERPOL’s databases. The Commission discloses the evidence or other information the government submits in response to the individual’s request if the government agrees to such disclosure.

The authors of the op-ed rightfully point to the reforms INTERPOL has recently carried out to expand the rights of individuals. However, despite the reforms, the existing redress mechanism still lacks some crucial safeguards inherent to the modern democratic due process, such as the right to a hearing and the right to appeal. In June 2014, the INTERPOL Executive Committee endorsed a new policy on refugees. According to the policy, “in general, the processing of red notices and diffusions against refugees will not be allowed if the following conditions are met: the status of refugee or asylum-seeker has been confirmed, the notice/diffusion has been requested by the country where the individual fears persecution, the granting of refugee status is not based on political grounds vis-a-vis the requesting country.” Although the policy is a significant step towards protection of refugees from INTERPOL abuse, it needs improvements. For example, the policy doesn’t grant refugees an exception to the rule that INTERPOL doesn’t disclose whether there is information about the individual in its databases without the government’s consent. As a result, refugees, like other individuals, often learn about a red notice or diffusion against them after they are detained due to the INTERPOL alert. In such cases, the rights provided in the policy come too late. This is one of the reasons why the detention of refugees like Dogan Akhanli and Hamza Yalcin continues despite the fact that the policy has been in place for several years.

Turkey and Ukraine Trying to Involve INTERPOL in Mass Prosecutions?

By Yuriy Nemets | December 24, 2017 | Comments 0 Comment

In July 2017, Hürriyet Daily News reported that Turkey tried to put 60,000 individuals allegedly linked to the recent attempt to overthrow President Recep Tayyip Erdogan on the INTERPOL wanted list. Only INTERPOL and Turkey know how many of those 60,000 people had a red notice or diffusion recorded against them. It is unclear whether INTERPOL’s efforts to rebuff the attempt to abuse its channels have been effective.

*The New Mosque (Yeni Cami) in Istanbul, Turkey*

Turkey is not the only country that has sought to use INTERPOL to persecute members of the same political, business, or other group en masse, although its attempt is one of the most egregious. Whether through a regular election or coup, an incoming government may decide to open a criminal investigation into the former cabinet members and use INTERPOL to locate them and seek their extradition. Ukraine is yet another recent example of a new government seeking INTERPOL’s cooperation in apprehending its predecessors.

*Independence Square (Maidan Nezalezhnosti) in Kiev, Ukraine*

It has been reported that INTERPOL denied most of Ukraine’s repeated requests to put Viktor Yanukovich, the ex-president of Ukraine, and many of his former cabinet members on the international wanted list. Ukraine has criticized INTERPOL’s unwillingness to cooperate and accused the organization of political bias. It is evident, however, that with regard to the requests from Turkey and Ukraine INTERPOL has been doing exactly the opposite: it has been trying to maintain its neutrality and avoid any involvement in politics, as Article 3 of its Constitution requires.

China and Russia INTERPOL Appointments: Assessing the Human Rights Impact

By Yuriy Nemets | December 18, 2017 | Comments 0 Comment

In November 2016, the 85th INTERPOL General Assembly elected INTERPOL’s new president and vice-president. Mr. Meng Hongwei, a Vice Minister of Public Security and the head of the INTERPOL National Central Bureau in China, became INTERPOL’s President, and Mr. Alexander Prokopchuk, the head of the INTERPOL National Central Bureau in Russia, a vice-president. The appointments raised concerns over INTERPOL’s ability to maintain its adherence to the organization’s core principles of neutrality, non-involvement in activities of a political character, and protection of individuals from member countries that use INTERPOL’s resources to persecute political opponents and other victims of unlawful criminal prosecutions. For a long time, China and Russia have been widely criticized for human rights violations. Could these appointments affect INTERPOL’s neutrality and commitment to human rights?

INTERPOL’s President heads the organization’s Executive Committee. However, it is the General Assembly, not the Executive Committee, that has the supreme authority in the organization. The General Assembly sets the standards and principles for all INTERPOL’s activities. It is composed of delegates that represent each of the 192 member countries. Each member country has one vote in the General Assembly, and a simple majority makes decisions, except when the INTERPOL Constitution requires a two-thirds majority. The General Assembly adopted INTERPOL’s Constitution, the Rules on the Processing of Data, and other fundamental texts INTERPOL must comply with. These sources require that INTERPOL act in accordance with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, strictly prohibit the organization from engaging in any activity of a political, military, religious, or racial character, and forbid member countries to use INTERPOL’s resources to persecute individuals. Under the Constitution, the Executive Committee supervises the execution of General Assembly’s decisions. It is not within the Executive Committee’s purview to repeal or change them.

The Commission for the Control of INTERPOL’s Files guards INTERPOL’s independence and adherence to human rights too. The Commission is an independent body that ensures INTERPOL’s compliance with the Constitution and other regulations. The Commission adjudicates individual requests for access to information in INTERPOL’s files and requests to delete information from the organization’s databases. Its Statute is adopted by the General Assembly and its decisions are final and binding on INTERPOL. The Executive Committee is prohibited from interfering with any of the Commission’s activities or influencing its decisions. Tasked with overseeing the implementation of the General Assembly’s decisions, it is the Executive Committee’s obligation to ensure the Commission’s independence as guaranteed by the INTERPOL Constitution.

As described in INTERPOL’s regulations, the mechanism intended to ensure INTERPOL’s neutrality, including its independence from high-ranking appointments within the organization, looks robust. Let’s hope it works.

Category: Political Prosecutions & INTERPOL