Yuriy Nemets, Author at Red Notice Abuse Report

CCF Latest Report: Enforcement Loopholes, Political Prosecutions of Businessmen, Lack of Transparency

By Yuriy Nemets | March 28, 2019 | Comments 0 Comment

The Commission for the Control of INTERPOL’s Files (CCF) has published its new annual report. It covers the Commission’s activities throughout 2017, including the transition it has undergone to comply with its new Statute adopted by the INTERPOL General Assembly. The report also reflects on the problems with the enforcement of decisions to remove politically motivated or otherwise unlawful red notices and diffusions, the Commission’s application of Article 3 of the INTERPOL Constitution, and the lack of transparency in its public disclosures.

Last year, Spanish authorities detained Bill Browder, a prominent critic of Vladimir Putin. Although the full circumstances of this arrest remain unclear, it has been alleged that Spain acted on an active Russian request disseminated through INTERPOL’s channels. Prior to this arrest, Russia had made several attempts to publish a red notice against Mr. Browder. INTERPOL had refused to cooperate and called the case predominantly political. Nevertheless, in 2017, Russia reportedly succeeded in disseminating a diffusion against Mr. Browder. Unlike red notices, diffusions aren’t subject to any screening from INTERPOL prior to their publication.

After Mr. Browder’s arrest in Spain, INTERPOL’s enforcement of the Commission’s decisions became the center of attention. Did INTERPOL successfully block each and every red notice and diffusion already found to be in violation of its rules from being disseminated? I can think of only two reasons why an individual found to be a victim of INTERPOL abuse would appear on the international wanted list at the same country’s request: either INTERPOL did not have a comprehensive mechanism that would match incoming red notices and diffusions with its prior findings of abuse, or the organization had an unspoken policy which would under certain circumstances allow the same governments to put victims of their abuse back on the wanted list.

According to its latest report, “[t]he Commission dealt with cases where the sources of data have sent a diffusion to INTERPOL members to request the arrest of an individual, whereas a request for a red notice has previously been refused.” Moreover, “[i]t also processed requests which highlighted the use of the SLTD [(Stolen and Lost Travel Documents)] database where a diffusion or a notice to arrest a person was considered not to comply with INTERPOL’s rules.” In the report, the Commission calls this practice “misuse of INTERPOL’s channels,” and notes that it deletes any such data and informs the countries which received it that its channels cannot be used in such cases. The report, therefore, confirms that INTERPOL does not possess a comprehensive mechanism that would preclude the same governments from putting individuals found to be victims of red notice and diffusion abuse on the INTERPOL wanted list. This is, of course, unfortunate, because the loophole should be easy to fix by simply implementing a reliable computer software. The recent reforms aimed at guaranteeing individuals an effective remedy against INTERPOL abuse seem futile if governments can with impunity (taking into consideration INTERPOL’s unwillingness to punish countries-abusers) harass their victims by utilizing diffusions or the SLTD database. The question remains, after an abusive government exercises all these ‘options,’ is this the end of harassment, or is there yet another way to put the same individual back on the international wanted list by, for example, charging her/him with a new crime or issuing a different type of notice?

Another major takeaway from the Commission’s latest report is its application of Article 3 of the INTERPOL Constitution. In its 2016 annual report, the Commission for the first time in its annual public disclosures recognized politically motivated prosecutions of businessmen among the main issues before it. At the same time, it did not comment on its application of Article 3 in cases in which individuals have not actively engaged in any political activities but instead became victims of corrupt prosecutions, for example, in aid of an illegal takeover of their businesses or other proprietary rights. Some of the published excerpts from the Commission’s decisions in individual cases suggest that it has applied Article 3 in such cases despite the fact that there has been no active political activity on the part of the individuals challenging the governments’ use of INTERPOL’s channels. The 2017 annual report also suggests that the Commission has taken this approach: “While a few of [Article 3] cases involve former high-ranking politicians, most of them concern people involved in business activities and charged with various fraud-related offenses.” Although the Commission still has not unequivocally confirmed that Article 3 applies in such cases, its published decisions and the latest annual report suggest that it does.

The third important takeaway from the 2017 report is that the Commission has still not truly become any more transparent and yet again avoided disclosing the names of countries that have violated its rules. Despite the growing attention being paid to INTERPOL abuse, the number of instances in which the public learns about the countries-abusers and the nature of their violations is very low compared to the growing number of complaints the Commission receives from individuals. In its 2010 annual report the Commission identified member countries against which it had received the majority of complaints without, however, naming the countries the Commission found to be in violation of INTERPOL’s rules and the nature of their violations. None of the Commission’s reports for the following years, including its most recent report, identifies member countries against which the Commission has received complaints, the number of times the Commission found those countries in violations of its rules or the nature of their violations. The Commission purview clearly empowers it to disclose this information to the general public.

Hakeem al-Araibi Case Shows How Vulnerable Refugees Remain to INTERPOL Abuse

By Yuriy Nemets | February 11, 2019 | Comments 0 Comment

In February 2015, the INTERPOL Executive Committee disseminated among the organization’s member countries a new policy according to which INTERPOL would generally refuse to cooperate with governments seeking detention of refugees and asyum-seekers. Although the policy should help INTERPOL protect individuals from persecution, which the organization considers one of the primary objectives of all its activities, it has significant loopholes. One of such loopholes is that the policy does not consider refugees and asylum-seekers an exception to the INTERPOL general rule that an individual cannot learn whether there is a request for her or his arrest (known as a “red notice” or a “diffusion”) in the INTERPOL databases without the government’s consent. As a result, like other individuals, refugees and asylum-seekers often learn that there is a red notice or a diffusion against them only after they are detained due to an INTERPOL alert. An arrest may lead to a prolonged detention and potentially extradition. For refugees and asylum-seekers who find themselves in this situation, the rights provided for in the INTERPOL policy come too late.

Hakeem al-Araibi is far from the first refugee to be detained due to an INTERPOL alert since the organization introduced the policy. For example, in the summer of 2016, Italian authorities acting on an Iranian red notice detained Mehdi Khosravi, an Iranian national and human rights activist with refugee status granted by the United Kingdom. Similarly, Paramjeet Singh, a supporter of Sikhs’ right to self-determination who fled India and in 2000 was granted refugee status in Great Britain, was arrested in December 2015 due to an Indian red notice and spent two months in detention before Portugal agreed to release him.

Should we expect INTERPOL to improve the policy and stop the continuing abuse of its resources against refugees and asylum-seekers? In September 2017, the General Assembly, the body of supreme authority at INTERPOL, adopted a Resolution endorsing the Executive Committee’s policy. The Resolution, however, seems to indicate that the General Assembly is much more concerned about criminals abusing refugee status than governments abusing INTERPOL to persecute refugees and asylum seekers. While the Resolution calls upon governments and INTERPOL to do everything in their power to ensure that refugee status is not abused and to that end enhance the exchange of information in the process of examining asylum applications, it makes no reference to Article 3 of the INTERPOL Constitution, which strictly forbids the organization from participating in any activity of a political, military, religious or racial character, or to the need to protect individuals from persecution. Despite the continuing abuse of INTERPOL’s resources against refugees and asylum seekers, nothing in the Resolution calls upon INTERPOL to address the problem.

INTERPOL must make an exception and provide refugees and asylum seekers the right to know if there is information about them in the organization’s databases without obtaining prior consent from the respective governments. Otherwise, Hakeem al-Araibi will not be the last refugee-victim of INTERPOL abuse.

American Bar Association Panel ‘Red Notices and the INTERPOL Wanted List: Balancing Law Enforcement with Due Process’

By Yuriy Nemets | February 7, 2019 | Comments 0 Comment

On January 29, 2019, Theodore Bromund (The Heritage Foundation), Michelle Estlund (Estlund Law), Yuriy Nemets (Nemets Law Firm), Rebecca Schaeffer (Fair Trials) and Bruce Zagaris (Berliner Corcoran & Rowe) spoke at the event ‘Red Notices and the INTERPOL Wanted List: Balancing Law Enforcement with Due Process’ organized by the American Bar Association (ABA) and Association of Certified Financial Crime Specialists (ACFCS). The panel discussed the problem of INTERPOL abuse by governments that use the organization’s resources to persecute political opponents and other victims of unlawful criminal prosecutions:

United States Senators Introduce a Bill Against Russia’s Abuse of INTERPOL’s Resources

By Yuriy Nemets | December 18, 2018 | Comments 0 Comment

Senators Graham, Menendez, Gardner, and Cardin have recently introduced a bipartisan bill called “Defending American Security from Kremlin Aggression Act of 2018.” In addition to promoting the strengthening of the NATO alliance, increasing diplomatic efforts, fighting against international cybercrime, election interference and other measures, the bill addresses Russia’s abuse of INTERPOL’s resources: “It is the sense of Congress that the Government of the Russian Federation has abused and misused INTERPOL’s red notice and red diffusion mechanisms for overly political purposes and activities such as intimidating, harassing, and persecuting political opponents.” If the bill becomes law, it will be the first US law specifically targeting Russia for its abuse of INTERPOL’s channels.

The bill calls upon the United States Attorney General and the Secretary of Homeland Security to “use the voice and influence of the United States at INTERPOL to censure and sanction” Russia for its abuse of the organization’s resources, “including the suspension of [its] ability to use INTERPOL’s red notice and red diffusion mechanisms.” It is important to remember that the United States, like any other member country, has only one vote at the INTERPOL General Assembly. To address Russia’s abuse of red notices and diffusions, the United States will have to convince the majority of the organization’s member countries to join its efforts. Although the bill largely leaves it to the Attorney General and the Secretary of Homeland Security to decide on specific steps, it clearly obliges the agencies to actively seek a solution to the problem.

In addition to calling for increased efforts in the international arena, the bill contains important protections the United States would provide the victims of INTERPOL abuse: “No United States person or foreign person that is the subject of a red notice or red diffusion requested by the Government of the Russian Federation shall be denied access to any United States Government services or programs because the person is subject to such red notice or diffusion, including requesting asylum, requesting a visa, or participating in a visa waiver program or the Transportation Security Administration’s Trusted Traveler Program.” Although a red notice or diffusion on its own should not serve as proof of any misconduct on the part of the individual and, therefore, be used to deny her or him any of the services mentioned in the bill, in practice, US officials have often mistakenly interpreted red notices and diffusions as precisely that – evidence of criminal behavior.

Reportedly, there have been cases in which United States immigration judges denied asylum-seekers bond or refugee status or both and cited red notices or diffusions as a basis for their decisions. In such cases, immigration authorities have wrongly interpreted red notices and diffusions as evidence against asylum-seekers. At the same time, unlike asylum cases, which are often reviewed in courts and become a matter of public record, visa denials are rarely subject to judicial review, and there is no publicly available data regarding the number of visa applications denied due to an active red notice or diffusion. Despite the lack of comprehensive statistics, practitioners have sounded the alarm on the ever increasing number of such denials. It is, therefore, both timely and critical for Congress to put an end to this unlawful practice and adopt a law clearly proclaiming that red notices and diffusions are not admissible as evidence against the individual in question, whether it be an extradition, asylum or any other matter.

It is also important to remember that Russia is far from being the only abuser of INTERPOL’s channels, although it is arguably among the major ones. That is why US efforts should not be limited to specific countries. We need to help INTERPOL prevent the abuse or, at the very least, minimize it no matter who the abuser is. It is also important to remember that suspending the Russian government, or any other government, from issuing red notices and diffusions, as suggested in the bill, could have serious negative consequences for the security of the rest of INTERPOL’s 191 member countries. INTERPOL’s regulations give the organization the power to suspend any country’s use of its databases if the country utilizes them for unlawful purposes. It is not clear whether INTERPOL has ever resorted to this measure. However, such a measure could do more harm than good by crippling legitimate international police cooperation. If a country cannot access the INTERPOL databases, it might not be able to prevent real criminals from entering its territory and thereby escaping justice. At the same time, if a government’s access is suspended, and it cannot put individuals on the international wanted list, other governments may not be able to identify real criminals coming from a country with suspended access and thereby unwillingly provide them shelter and the ability to continue their criminal activities in their territory. Indeed, there are other measures that have been proposed which INTERPOL could adopt to minimize red notice and diffusion abuse without disrupting legitimate international police cooperation.

Bill Browder’s Case Highlights Loopholes in Relief INTERPOL Grants Victims of Red Notice Abuse

By Yuriy Nemets | July 16, 2018 | Comments 0 Comment

On May 30 of this year, acting on an INTERPOL alert, Spanish authorities detained Bill Browder, an outspoken critic of Vladimir Putin’s regime. Prior to this arrest, Russia had reportedly made at least five attempts to put Mr. Browder on the international wanted list. In the past, INTERPOL refused to cooperate, citing the Commission for the Control of INTERPOL’s Files (CCF), which concluded that his case was predominantly political. After several hours and, reportedly, the personal involvement of the INTERPOL Secretary General, Spanish police released Mr. Browder.

The full circumstances of this arrest remain unclear. According to some reports, at the time, there was an active Russian request to detain Mr. Browder published in INTERPOL’s database. INTERPOL, however, denied its involvement, and some commentators argued that Spain could have acted on old information in its national database, which the country failed to update timely to reflect the changes in INTERPOL’s files. In its public statement, INTERPOL denies that there has ever been a red notice against Mr. Browder recorded in its database, but as Ted Bromund rightfully notes, the statement “is economic with the truth.” The fact that INTERPOL has never approved a red notice against Mr. Browder doesn’t mean that there has never been a diffusion against him in the organization’s database. Unlike red notices, diffusions aren’t subject to any screening from INTERPOL prior to their publication. Indeed, in 2017, Russia reportedly succeeded in publishing a diffusion against Mr. Browder. That is, after several unsuccessful attempts to have INTERPOL approve a red notice, the Russian government took the easier path of publishing a diffusion, thereby bypassing any preliminary check from the organization.

Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation, Moscow

Whether it was a failure to update the national database or a new diffusion that led to Mr. Browder’s arrest in Spain, both can happen to anyone who has ever been on the INTERPOL wanted list. As long as either of these scenarios exists, any relief the CCF grants victims of red notice or diffusion abuse is limited at best.

The fact that individuals remain under the threat of arrest just because INTERPOL and its member countries have failed to ensure that national and INTERPOL databases are simultaneously updated is, quite frankly, appalling. Objectively, this should have been the first obvious step to ensure that decisions to remove individuals from the international wanted list were enforced. At the same time, the lack of an official public statement from INTERPOL on how it works to prevent the publication of red notices and diffusions the CCF has already declared unlawful, is yet another reason to wonder if the organization even has a plan to deal with the problem.

The public deserves to know whether INTERPOL is committed to enforcing its own decisions not to cooperate with governments in individual cases. Does the organization monitor all incoming red notices and diffusions to make sure they are not published if the CCF has already found them to be predominantly political or otherwise unlawful? If it is a matter of finding and implementing a reliable technology, the loophole should be easy to fix: such monitoring could be conducted via reliable computer software. If, however, it is a matter of policy and INTERPOL allows governments to publish red notices and diffusions already found to be in violation of the organization’s rules, the problem is much more serious.

The Prosecutor General’s Office of the Russian Federation, Moscow

If INTERPOL has interpreted its rules to mean that governments can, under certain circumstances, place individuals, whose complaints the CCF has already approved, on the international wanted list, then its interpretation is wrong. Only the CCF has the power to reverse its own decisions. Neither the INTERPOL Constitution nor its other regulations grant any other body that power. If INTERPOL believes it can allow a government to put an individual, already declared a victim of INTERPOL abuse, on the wanted list if the government simply brings new charges, it is hard to imagine that INTERPOL doesn’t realize how easy it is for a government to come up with new trumped-up charges.

Whether it is a technological or a policy loophole that allows governments to continue to use INTERPOL to persecute individuals the CCF has already declared victims of red notice or diffusion abuse, that loophole must be closed immediately. If INTERPOL fails to act, there will be many more cases like Bill Browder’s. In the meantime, Russia is already reportedly considering its next, seventh, attempt to put him on the international wanted list.

INTERPOL Red Notice Abuse: Whistleblowers Have Rights Too

By Yuriy Nemets | May 2, 2018 | Comments 0 Comment

It has been reported that INTERPOL has refused to cooperate with Russia in the case of Grigory Rodchenkov, the former head of Russia’s anti-doping laboratory-turned-whistleblower. Mr. Rochenkov has publicly accused the Russian government of running a doping scheme during the 2014 Winter Olympics in Sochi. Mr. Rodchenkov’s case may look like just another government trying to abuse INTERPOL’s resources to persecute a political opponent. However, it stands out because the target of the red notice is a whistleblower wanted not because of his political beliefs but because as a previous insider, he witnessed and exposed the government’s misconduct.

Mr. Rodchenkov’s story prompted the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) to investigate the allegations. Mr. Rodchenkov’s story is described in media reports and the Academy Award-winning documentary “Icarus.” After Mr. Rodchenkov went public with his story, the Russian government filed criminal charges against him. He managed to leave the country, and Russian law enforcement sought INTERPOL’s cooperation in locating him and bringing him back.

INTERPOL’s rules don’t specifically address the red notice abuse against whistleblowers. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that the INTERPOL Constitution and the organization’s regulations based on it protect whistleblowers to the same degree they protect politicians, activists, reporters, entrepreneurs, and other individuals who often become victims of politically motivated criminal charges. Mr. Rodchenkov’s case proves that to comply with its Constitution, which strictly prohibits INTERPOL from undertaking any activity of a political nature, it is crucial for the organization to protect whistleblowers from the abuse of its resources.

INTERPOL Sees Increase in Complaints from Refugees, Highlights Politically Motivated Prosecutions of Businessmen Among Main Issues

By Yuriy Nemets | March 12, 2018 | Comments 0 Comment

In its 2016, most recent, annual report, the Commission for the Control of INTERPOL’s Files cites an increase in the number of complaints from refugees and for the first time in its annual public disclosures recognizes politically motivated prosecutions of businessmen among the main issues before it. Although notable, the increase in complaints from refugees was expected. In June 2014, the INTERPOL Executive Committee introduced a policy, which provided refugees with a somewhat simplified path to red-notice-free status. It isn’t surprising, therefore, that more refugees have been petitioning INTERPOL to delete their information from its files. However, that INTERPOL has finally publicly named politically motivated red notices issued against businessmen among its main issues is a very important development.

For a long time, long before the Commission’s 2016 report, entrepreneurs have been among the main targets of INTERPOL red notice abuse. Nevertheless, INTERPOL would not admit the problem to the general public. Instead, human rights advocates and the media reported multiple individual cases. Entrepreneurs who take on an active role in politics or find themselves in a dispute with a government or with someone closely connected to the government often become victims of corrupt prosecutions based on trumped-up charges. Such prosecutions are regularly used to retaliate against entrepreneurs who refuse to cease their political activities, give up their business interests, or abandon legitimate civil lawsuits or administrative or criminal complaints. Entrepreneurs who manage to leave their countries before the government restricts their freedom of movement are often arrested abroad, placed in extradition proceedings, find themselves unable to travel, do business, or simply open a personal bank account due to the red notice or diffusion recorded in INTERPOL’s files.

Article 2 of the INTERPOL Constitution requires international police cooperation to be conducted in accordance with the member countries’ national laws and in the spirit of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and Article 3 strictly forbids INTERPOL to undertake any “intervention or activities of a political, military, religious or racial character.” An individual on the INTERPOL wanted list who believes that in the course of the criminal case the government violated the country’s laws, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, or prosecuted the individual for her or his political beliefs should consider invoking Article 2 or Article 3 or both. In addition, entrepreneurs should consider the “private disputes” provision of the INTERPOL Rules on the Processing of Data. The provision prohibits the publication of a red notice if the offense behind it derives from a private dispute, “unless the criminal activity is aimed at facilitating a serious crime or is suspected of being connected to organized crime.” Some of the Commission’s decisions regarding red notices and diffusions issued against entrepreneurs suggest that entrepreneurs may indeed benefit from the “private disputes” provision, for example, when a red notice or diffusion arises from a dispute of a civil, rather than criminal, nature and, therefore, must be resolved in the course of a civil, rather than criminal, trial.

The INTERPOL Repository of Practice contains very useful information about INTERPOL’s application of Article 3 to red notices and diffusions issued in a political context, including charges against current and former politicians, offences concerning freedom of expression, assembly, and association, security of the state, unconstitutional seizure of power, embargo and sanctions, and elections. Since 2014, the Commission for the Control of INTERPOL’s Files has seen an increase in the number of complaints alleging violations of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. In this regard, INTERPOL has yet to compile a repository of practice on Article 2 of the Constitution, although the Commission has already started developing its own “case law” in this area. Now, that the Commission has recognized unlawful prosecutions of businessmen among the main issues before it, it is time for the Commission and INTERPOL to admit that the “private disputes” provision needs its own repository of practice. Indeed, when engaging in corrupt prosecutions, governments often charge entrepreneurs with crimes of a business nature that may look like they are related to the entrepreneur’s professional activities and thereby lend the criminal case some appearance of legitimacy but in fact are used to illegally transform what really is a civil private dispute into a criminal case. It is, therefore, crucial for INTERPOL and the Commission to be transparent about how they interpret and apply the “private disputes” provision and for that purpose compile, publish, and constantly update a detailed repository of practice.

Due to lack of deterrence, Russia’s INTERPOL membership is unlikely to be threatened despite numerous violations

By Yuriy Nemets | February 16, 2018 | Comments 0 Comment

Bill Browder has called upon INTERPOL to suspend Russia’s membership after the country renewed its efforts to put him on the international wanted list. Despite five unsuccessful attempts, Russia’s law enforcement agencies hope to secure INTERPOL’s cooperation in Mr. Browder’s case. So far, the organization has been unwilling to cooperate and in a rare public statement about an individual case called it predominantly political. However, despite Russia’s repeated violations of INTERPOL’s rules in this and other cases, the country’s membership is unlikely in any danger.

Under its regulations, INTERPOL is authorized to suspend or withdraw any user’s access to the organization’s databases, including any of its member countries, if that user violates INTERPOL’s rules on data processing. It is unclear whether INTERPOL has ever used that power. Certain recent examples suggest that the organization would rather avoid punishing a country. For example, it has been reported that Turkey tried to put 60,000 individuals allegedly linked to the 2016 failed coup against President Recep Tayyip Erdogan on the INTERPOL wanted list. According to these reports, INTERPOL refused to sanction Turkey for what appears to be an unprecedented violation of the organization’s Constitution, which strictly forbids INTERPOL to undertake any intervention or activities of a political character. If INTERPOL is reluctant to punish governments for such egregious violations, is there a limit, which, if crossed, would eventually force the organization to sanction the government?

INTERPOL’s unwillingness to suspend or withdraw access to its resources is not without reason. A country without access to INTERPOL’s databases might not be able to identify criminals wanted by other countries or inform foreign law enforcement about criminals possibly entering their territories, which could be detrimental to regional and global security. However, without a punishment effective enough to deter governments from abusing INTERPOL’s resources, the organization will always remain a tool in the hands of oppressive regimes.

On INTERPOL’s former General Counsel’s statement regarding EU calls to reform INTERPOL

By Yuriy Nemets | December 28, 2017 | Comments 0 Comment

On October 5, 2017, EUObserver reported that the European Union was seeking a dialogue with INTERPOL to find a way to stop the abuse of its resources by countries that use INTERPOL to persecute political opponents and other victims of unlawful criminal prosecutions. The call for negotiations followed the recent detention of Dogan Akhanli, a German-Turkish writer, and Hamza Yalcin, a Swedish-Turkish journalist. Spanish authorities detained them at Turkey’s request disseminated via INTERPOL’s channels. Akhanli and Yalcin fled Turkey many years ago and were granted refugee status in Europe.

In seeking the dialogue, the European Union leaders expressed their desire for a proper review of INTERPOL red notices. They have also indicated that the need exists for an effective redress mechanism for the victims of INTERPOL abuse.

On October 16, 2017, EUObserver published an op-ed titled ‘INTERPOL and the EU: don’t play politics.’ Its authors, Rutsel Sylvestre J. Martha, an INTERPOL’s former General Counsel, and Stephen Bailey, argue that the INTERPOL General Secretariat already conducts a proper review of red notices before their publication and an effective redress mechanism is already in place.

Indeed, INTERPOL must ensure that red notices comply with its rules. Every year INTERPOL processes numerous requests to locate and detain individuals. It would seem possible for the organization to review every red notice for its compliance with such minimum requirements as the nature of the charge behind the notice and make sure the identity particulars, the description of the facts of the case, and a reference to the country’s criminal statute and a valid arrest warrant accompany the red notice. However, taking into consideration the high volume of information INTERPOL processes on a regular basis, it cannot possibly look into all the circumstances behind each and every red notice to make sure none is politically motivated or doesn’t otherwise violate the organization’s rules prior to its publication. This is also true with regard to the compliance review of randomly selected already published red notices. In addition, the authors of the op-ed don’t mention the so-called “diffusions,” which, like red notices, may be used as requests to locate and detain individuals for the purpose of their extradition and may be disseminated among a large number of INTERPOL member countries. However, unlike red notices, governments can send diffusions via INTERPOL’s channels without any prior review by the General Secretariat. Because of the lack of oversight prior to their publication, diffusions represent a more attractive means for governments that abuse INTERPOL’s resources, and as such, they pose an even higher risk than red notices.

In claiming there is an effective redress mechanism for the victims of INTERPOL abuse, the authors of the op-ed mention the right of an individual to access, correct, and/or delete information in INTERPOL’s files. It is important to remember that the right to access the information in the organization’s databases is subject to the government’s consent to disclose such information to the individual. This is also the case with any evidence and other information the government submits to the Commission for the Control of INTERPOL’s Files, an independent body with the exclusive power to adjudicate requests from individuals seeking access to, correction, and/or deletion of information in INTERPOL’s databases. The Commission discloses the evidence or other information the government submits in response to the individual’s request if the government agrees to such disclosure.

The authors of the op-ed rightfully point to the reforms INTERPOL has recently carried out to expand the rights of individuals. However, despite the reforms, the existing redress mechanism still lacks some crucial safeguards inherent to the modern democratic due process, such as the right to a hearing and the right to appeal. In June 2014, the INTERPOL Executive Committee endorsed a new policy on refugees. According to the policy, “in general, the processing of red notices and diffusions against refugees will not be allowed if the following conditions are met: the status of refugee or asylum-seeker has been confirmed, the notice/diffusion has been requested by the country where the individual fears persecution, the granting of refugee status is not based on political grounds vis-a-vis the requesting country.” Although the policy is a significant step towards protection of refugees from INTERPOL abuse, it needs improvements. For example, the policy doesn’t grant refugees an exception to the rule that INTERPOL doesn’t disclose whether there is information about the individual in its databases without the government’s consent. As a result, refugees, like other individuals, often learn about a red notice or diffusion against them after they are detained due to the INTERPOL alert. In such cases, the rights provided in the policy come too late. This is one of the reasons why the detention of refugees like Dogan Akhanli and Hamza Yalcin continues despite the fact that the policy has been in place for several years.

Turkey and Ukraine Trying to Involve INTERPOL in Mass Prosecutions?

By Yuriy Nemets | December 24, 2017 | Comments 0 Comment

In July 2017, Hürriyet Daily News reported that Turkey tried to put 60,000 individuals allegedly linked to the recent attempt to overthrow President Recep Tayyip Erdogan on the INTERPOL wanted list. Only INTERPOL and Turkey know how many of those 60,000 people had a red notice or diffusion recorded against them. It is unclear whether INTERPOL’s efforts to rebuff the attempt to abuse its channels have been effective.

*The New Mosque (Yeni Cami) in Istanbul, Turkey*

Turkey is not the only country that has sought to use INTERPOL to persecute members of the same political, business, or other group en masse, although its attempt is one of the most egregious. Whether through a regular election or coup, an incoming government may decide to open a criminal investigation into the former cabinet members and use INTERPOL to locate them and seek their extradition. Ukraine is yet another recent example of a new government seeking INTERPOL’s cooperation in apprehending its predecessors.

*Independence Square (Maidan Nezalezhnosti) in Kiev, Ukraine*

It has been reported that INTERPOL denied most of Ukraine’s repeated requests to put Viktor Yanukovich, the ex-president of Ukraine, and many of his former cabinet members on the international wanted list. Ukraine has criticized INTERPOL’s unwillingness to cooperate and accused the organization of political bias. It is evident, however, that with regard to the requests from Turkey and Ukraine INTERPOL has been doing exactly the opposite: it has been trying to maintain its neutrality and avoid any involvement in politics, as Article 3 of its Constitution requires.

Author: Yuriy Nemets