Category: Entrepreneurs on the INTERPOL List

INTERPOL Sees Increase in Complaints from Refugees, Highlights Politically Motivated Prosecutions of Businessmen Among Main Issues

INTERPOL Sees Increase in Complaints from Refugees, Highlights Politically Motivated Prosecutions of Businessmen Among Main Issues

In its 2016, most recent, annual report, the Commission for the Control of INTERPOL’s Files cites an increase in the number of complaints from refugees and for the first time in its annual public disclosures recognizes politically motivated prosecutions of businessmen among the main issues before it.  Although notable, the increase in complaints from refugees was expected.  In June 2014, the INTERPOL Executive Committee introduced a policy, which provided refugees with a somewhat simplified path to red-notice-free status.  It isn’t surprising, therefore, that more refugees have been petitioning INTERPOL to delete their information from its files.  However, that INTERPOL has finally publicly named politically motivated red notices issued against businessmen among its main issues is a very important development.

For a long time, long before the Commission’s 2016 report, entrepreneurs have been among the main targets of INTERPOL red notice abuse.  Nevertheless, INTERPOL would not admit the problem to the general public. Instead, human rights advocates and the media reported multiple individual cases.  Entrepreneurs who take on an active role in politics or find themselves in a dispute with a government or with someone closely connected to the government often become victims of corrupt prosecutions based on trumped-up charges.  Such prosecutions are regularly used to retaliate against entrepreneurs who refuse to cease their political activities, give up their business interests, or abandon legitimate civil lawsuits or administrative or criminal complaints.  Entrepreneurs who manage to leave their countries before the government restricts their freedom of movement are often arrested abroad, placed in extradition proceedings, find themselves unable to travel, do business, or simply open a personal bank account due to the red notice or diffusion recorded in INTERPOL’s files.

Article 2 of the INTERPOL Constitution requires international police cooperation to be conducted in accordance with the member countries’ national laws and in the spirit of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and Article 3 strictly forbids INTERPOL to undertake any “intervention or activities of a political, military, religious or racial character.”  An individual on the INTERPOL wanted list who believes that in the course of the criminal case the government violated the country’s laws, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, or prosecuted the individual for her or his political beliefs should consider invoking Article 2 or Article 3 or both.  In addition, entrepreneurs should consider the “private disputes” provision of the INTERPOL Rules on the Processing of Data.  The provision prohibits the publication of a red notice if the offense behind it derives from a private dispute, “unless the criminal activity is aimed at facilitating a serious crime or is suspected of being connected to organized crime.”  Some of the Commission’s decisions regarding red notices and diffusions issued against entrepreneurs suggest that entrepreneurs may indeed benefit from the “private disputes” provision, for example, when a red notice or diffusion arises from a dispute of a civil, rather than criminal, nature and, therefore, must be resolved in the course of a civil, rather than criminal, trial.

The INTERPOL Repository of Practice contains very useful information about INTERPOL’s application of Article 3 to red notices and diffusions issued in a political context, including charges against current and former politicians, offences concerning freedom of expression, assembly, and association, security of the state, unconstitutional seizure of power, embargo and sanctions, and elections.  Since 2014, the Commission for the Control of INTERPOL’s Files has seen an increase in the number of complaints alleging violations of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.  In this regard, INTERPOL has yet to compile a repository of practice on Article 2 of the Constitution, although the Commission has already started developing its own “case law” in this area.  Now, that the Commission has recognized unlawful prosecutions of businessmen among the main issues before it, it is time for the Commission and INTERPOL to admit  that the “private disputes” provision needs its own repository of practice.  Indeed, when engaging in corrupt prosecutions, governments often charge entrepreneurs with crimes of a business nature that may look like they are related to the entrepreneur’s professional activities and thereby lend the criminal case some appearance of legitimacy but in fact are used to illegally transform what really is a civil private dispute into a criminal case.  It is, therefore, crucial for INTERPOL and the Commission to be transparent about how they interpret and apply the “private disputes” provision and for that purpose compile, publish, and constantly update a detailed repository of practice.

Due to lack of deterrence, Russia’s INTERPOL membership is unlikely to be threatened despite numerous violations

Due to lack of deterrence, Russia’s INTERPOL membership is unlikely to be threatened despite numerous violations

The Moscow Kremlin, Russia

Bill Browder has called upon INTERPOL to suspend Russia’s membership after the country renewed its efforts to put him on the international wanted list. Despite five unsuccessful attempts, Russia’s law enforcement agencies hope to secure INTERPOL’s cooperation in Mr. Browder’s case. So far, the organization has been unwilling to cooperate and in a rare public statement about an individual case called it predominantly political. However, despite Russia’s repeated violations of INTERPOL’s rules in this and other cases, the country’s membership is unlikely in any danger.

Under its regulations, INTERPOL is authorized to suspend or withdraw any user’s access to the organization’s databases, including any of its member countries, if that user violates INTERPOL’s rules on data processing. It is unclear whether INTERPOL has ever used that power. Certain recent examples suggest that the organization would rather avoid punishing a country. For example, it has been reported that Turkey tried to put 60,000 individuals allegedly linked to the 2016 failed coup against President Recep Tayyip Erdogan on the INTERPOL wanted list. According to these reports, INTERPOL refused to sanction Turkey for what appears to be an unprecedented violation of the organization’s Constitution, which strictly forbids INTERPOL to undertake any intervention or activities of a political character. If INTERPOL is reluctant to punish governments for such egregious violations, is there a limit, which, if crossed, would eventually force the organization to sanction the government?

The Prosecutor General’s Office of the Russian Federation, Moscow

INTERPOL’s unwillingness to suspend or withdraw access to its resources is not without reason. A country without access to INTERPOL’s databases might not be able to identify criminals wanted by other countries or inform foreign law enforcement about criminals possibly entering their territories, which could be detrimental to regional and global security. However, without a punishment effective enough to deter governments from abusing INTERPOL’s resources, the organization will always remain a tool in the hands of oppressive regimes.

Turkey and Ukraine Trying to Involve INTERPOL in Mass Prosecutions?

Turkey and Ukraine Trying to Involve INTERPOL in Mass Prosecutions?

In July 2017, Hürriyet Daily News reported that Turkey tried to put 60,000 individuals allegedly linked to the recent attempt to overthrow President Recep Tayyip Erdogan on the INTERPOL wanted list. Only INTERPOL and Turkey know how many of those 60,000 people had a red notice or diffusion recorded against them. It is unclear whether INTERPOL’s efforts to rebuff the attempt to abuse its channels have been effective.

The New Mosque (Yeni Cami) in Istanbul, Turkey

Turkey is not the only country that has sought to use INTERPOL to persecute members of the same political, business, or other group en masse, although its attempt is one of the most egregious. Whether through a regular election or coup, an incoming government may decide to open a criminal investigation into the former cabinet members and use INTERPOL to locate them and seek their extradition. Ukraine is yet another recent example of a new government seeking INTERPOL’s cooperation in apprehending its predecessors.

Independence Square (Maidan Nezalezhnosti) in Kiev, Ukraine

It has been reported that INTERPOL denied most of Ukraine’s repeated requests to put Viktor Yanukovich, the ex-president of Ukraine, and many of his former cabinet members on the international wanted list. Ukraine has criticized INTERPOL’s unwillingness to cooperate and accused the organization of political bias. It is evident, however, that with regard to the requests from Turkey and Ukraine INTERPOL has been doing exactly the opposite: it has been trying to maintain its neutrality and avoid any involvement in politics, as Article 3 of its Constitution requires.

 

China and Russia INTERPOL Appointments: Assessing the Human Rights Impact

China and Russia INTERPOL Appointments: Assessing the Human Rights Impact

In November 2016, the 85th INTERPOL General Assembly elected INTERPOL’s new president and vice-president. Mr. Meng Hongwei, a Vice Minister of Public Security and the head of the INTERPOL National Central Bureau in China, became INTERPOL’s President, and Mr. Alexander Prokopchuk, the head of the INTERPOL National Central Bureau in Russia, a vice-president. The appointments raised concerns over INTERPOL’s ability to maintain its adherence to the organization’s core principles of neutrality, non-involvement in activities of a political character, and protection of individuals from member countries that use INTERPOL’s resources to persecute political opponents and other victims of unlawful criminal prosecutions. For a long time, China and Russia have been widely criticized for human rights violations. Could these appointments affect INTERPOL’s neutrality and commitment to human rights?

Tiananmen Square in Beijing, China

INTERPOL’s President heads the organization’s Executive Committee. However, it is the General Assembly, not the Executive Committee, that has the supreme authority in the organization. The General Assembly sets the standards and principles for all INTERPOL’s activities. It is composed of delegates that represent each of the 192 member countries. Each member country has one vote in the General Assembly, and a simple majority makes decisions, except when the INTERPOL Constitution requires a two-thirds majority. The General Assembly adopted INTERPOL’s Constitution, the Rules on the Processing of Data, and other fundamental texts INTERPOL must comply with. These sources require that INTERPOL act in accordance with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, strictly prohibit the organization from engaging in any activity of a political, military, religious, or racial character, and forbid member countries to use INTERPOL’s resources to persecute individuals. Under the Constitution, the Executive Committee supervises the execution of General Assembly’s decisions. It is not within the Executive Committee’s purview to repeal or change them.

The Moscow Kremlin, Russia

The Commission for the Control of INTERPOL’s Files guards INTERPOL’s independence and adherence to human rights too. The Commission is an independent body that ensures INTERPOL’s compliance with the Constitution and other regulations. The Commission adjudicates individual requests for access to information in INTERPOL’s files and requests to delete information from the organization’s databases. Its Statute is adopted by the General Assembly and its decisions are final and binding on INTERPOL. The Executive Committee is prohibited from interfering with any of the Commission’s activities or influencing its decisions. Tasked with overseeing the implementation of the General Assembly’s decisions, it is the Executive Committee’s obligation to ensure the Commission’s independence as guaranteed by the INTERPOL Constitution.

As described in INTERPOL’s regulations, the mechanism intended to ensure INTERPOL’s neutrality, including its independence from high-ranking appointments within the organization, looks robust. Let’s hope it works.

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